John Rawls vs Robert Nozick

The question of what constitutes a just society finds two diametrically opposed answers in the work of John Rawls and Robert Nozick. 

Rawls, in A Theory of Justice (1971), asks us to imagine designing a society’s basic structure-its constitution, its economic system-from behind a “veil of ignorance.” In this original position, no one knows their future place in society: their class, race, gender, natural talents, or conception of the good life. Deprived of this knowledge, Rawls argues, rational individuals would choose principles that no one could reasonably reject, as they might end up in the least advantaged position. They would agree, first, to a principle guaranteeing the most extensive basic liberties for all compatible with similar liberties for others. Second, they would endorse a difference principle: social and economic inequalities are permissible only if they are arranged to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society. This justifies redistributive taxation and a robust social safety net; inequalities are only just if they somehow improve the lot of the worst-off. For Rawls, justice is fairness, and fairness requires a structure that mitigates the moral arbitrariness of natural and social lottery.

Robert Nozick, in Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), launches a libertarian critique from the premise that individuals have rights which “are side constraints” on the actions of others and the state. His entitlement theory of justice is historical and procedural. A distribution of holdings is just if it arises from: 

1) a just initial acquisition (claiming unowned resources via labor, à la Locke), 

2) just transfer (voluntary exchange, gift, or trade), or

3) just rectification of past injustices. If these three conditions are met, the resulting distribution is just, no matter how unequal. 

Nozick rejects any “patterned” principle of justice (like Rawls’s difference principle or a utilitarian goal) that requires continuous redistribution to maintain a specific end-state (like equality or benefitting the least advantaged). To tax a person’s earnings to redistribute to others, he famously argued, is on a par with forced labor; it violates the person’s self-ownership. The only morally justified state is a minimal “night-watchman” state limited to protecting against force, fraud, theft, and enforcing contracts. Any more extensive state violates individual rights. 

For Nozick, justice is not about achieving a particular distributive pattern but about respecting the process of free exchange and individual choice. The debate between them frames a fundamental political choice: Is the primary concern of justice the condition of the worst-off (Rawls) or the liberty of the individual from coercion (Nozick)? 

What do you think?

This is not an abstract academic dispute but the philosophical bedrock of contemporary arguments over taxation, welfare, and the very purpose of government.